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Abstract: Stephen Read has advanced a solution of certain semantic paradoxes
recently, based on the work of Thomas Bradwardine. One consequence of this
approach, however, is that if Socrates utters only ‘Socrates utters a falsehood’ (a),
while Plato says ‘Socrates utters a falsehood’ (b), then, for Bradwardine two dif-
ferent propositions are involved on account of (a) being self-referential, while (b)
is not. Problems with this consequence are first discussed before a closely related
analysis is provided that escapes it. Moreover, this alternative analysis merely re-
lies on quantification theory at the propositional level, so there is very little to
question about it. The paper is the third in a series explaining the superior virtues
of a referential form of propositional quantification.
Stephen Read has advanced a solution of certain semantic paradoxes recently,
based on the work of Thomas Bradwardine [4, 5, 6, 7]. Read claims that Tarski’s
T-scheme, in the form
(T) T(s)  A
must be improved so that, while Tarski “said that (T) should hold when what
replaces ‘A’ is a translation (into the metalanguage) of the sentence whose name
is ‘s’ . . . Bradwardine’s point is that what replaces ‘A’ in (T) must express every-
thing that the utterance named by ‘s’ expresses or signifies” [7, p. 166]. Writing
‘Sig(s,A)’ to express the fact that sentence (‘utterance-type’) s signifies that A,
Read defines the truth and falsity of sentences in the following fashion:
Tr(s)  (9A)Sig(s,A) & (8A)(Sig(s,A) ﬀ A)
Fa(s)  (9A)(Sig(s,A) & ¬A)
He then takes Bradwardine’s major principle to mean that if A entails B then
Sig(s,A) entails Sig(s, B), so that while, for instance, in a paradoxical case,
Tarski would think that a given sentence meant just that it was false, or not
true, Bradwardine would start from the assumption that the sentence might
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express or signify not only that but something else, as well: Sig(s, Fa(s) & Q).
In fact it follows from Bradwardine’s principles that no sentence can signify
just that that it is false, or not true. After resolving an impressive number
of puzzles on this basis, Read has summed up: ‘Once truth and meaning are
properly understood, so that an utterance is true only if everything it signifies
obtains, paradox is prevented without need for logical revision’ [7, pp. 175–6].
One consequence of this approach, however, is that if Socrates utters only
‘Socrates utters a falsehood’ (a), while Plato says ‘Socrates utters a falsehood’
(b), then, for Bradwardine two different propositions are involved on account
of (a) being self-referential, while (b) is not. It cannot be the same proposition
that is involved since, on Bradwardine’s account, the first is false while the
second is true. Thus Read says ([7, p. 171]—though take care, the two truth-
values of (a) and (b) are accidentally reversed on line 3 of this page):
Bradwardine’s response was that (a) and (b) were not the same
proposition, since (a) is self-referential, saying of itself that it is
false, and so, by Thesis (2), saying also that it is true. That is why it
is false. But (b) is not self-referential, but says (only) that (a) is false
(and uttered by Socrates). . . . Superficially, (a) and (b) are tokens
of the same utterance type, so it might seem that we have here
a counterexample to my earlier claim that Bradwardine attributed
truth and signification to utterance types. However, we have just
seen that (a) and (b) differ in signification. So they are tokens of
different sentence-types.
But what is another token (if there is one) of the sentence-type that Socrates
is then supposed to utter? Since (a) is a token sentence, Socrates’ uttering the
same words again would, on Read’s analysis, involve self-reference to another,
different token, and so could not have the same signification as (a). What does
have the same signification, supposedly, is ‘(a) is false and (a) is true and (a) is
uttered by Socrates’. But that is certainly not of the same sentence-type as (a).
And does it even have the same content? That is the more important ques-
tion. Read seems, in fact, to be forgetting the rules about translation into
reported speech, and specifically confusing a proper name with an egocentric
particular. One must take the utterer into account to get the content of what
is said if the speaker says ‘I am uttering a falsehood’. But nothing needs to
be changed if a proper name is involved, as in ‘Socrates utters a falsehood’.
How else is anyone going to report what Socrates said in the given case if not by
uttering what Plato did, or its equivalent?
Maybe Read, after a re-consideration, would like to say that what Socrates
says in the case above is in fact untranslatable. This option is taken by ‘cassa-
tionists’ [2], and would mean saying that Socrates’ utterance did not express a
proposition, making Plato’s remark false, since Socrates’ was neither true nor
false. But surely Socrates agrees with Plato; he can even say ‘Yes!’ or ‘That’s true’
after Plato’s utterance. So Socrates must be able to have the same thought as
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Plato; indeed, as before, the rules of reported speech require that in the con-
text above both have the same thought. So it has to be pointed out that there is
another treatment of the same puzzles Read has been dealing with that is much
more in Bradwardine’s spirit, yet does not get into the same difficulties [8, 11].
I use an improved form of Prior’s propositional quantification incorpo-
rating Cocchiarella’s nominalising functor ‘λ’ (‘that’, see [1, pp. 216–7]), which
makes ‘λp’ a phrase referring to the proposition expressed by ‘p’ on the occa-
sion of its use, with the standard interpretation. Propositional identity state-
ments of the form ‘λp = λq’ are true only if ‘p’ and ‘q’ are synonymous, which
involves a tighter relation than logical equivalence. But there are many other
propositional identity statements that are not of this form, since there are
many other ways to refer to propositions than by using ‘that’-clauses. Here
I also use the epsilon calculus (rather than the predicate calculus) to provide
other propositional referential terms; together these two improvements enable
one to generate all the identity statements that are needed. As we shall see, it
is the provision of propositional referential terms that chiefly separates this al-
ternative treatment from Read’s, and specifically in the above and similar cases
it allows the extra significance of the puzzling utterances to be pointed towards
while leaving it un-expressed, thereby capturing in a more appropriate way its
‘non-translatability’. I write ‘Sxr’ for ‘(sentence) x signifies (proposition) r’, so
that ‘rSxr’ means ‘what x signifies’ (which might be a matter of choice if there
are several things x signifies). General equivalences are then that Tλp  p, and
that SxrSxr  (9r)Sxr.
Read does not use propositional referential terms, as we saw at the start;
nor does he have a truth predicate with propositions. Thus his analysis in-
volves quantification over expressed sentences, as with ‘(9A)Sig(s,A)’, in the
manner of Prior, and the truth of propositions is not represented as a predi-
cate, but simply by the assertion of the proposition, if at all. That leads him to
bring in what extra might be involved in a case of self-reference by means of
some further expressed sentence: viz ‘Sig(s, Fa(s) & Q)’. From this, using the
principles indicated above, Read easily draws the conclusion Fa(s) [7, p. 169],
leading him to take this to be the case when Socrates utters ‘Socrates utters a
falsehood’, but, of course, not to be the case when Plato utters the same thing.
So he is drawn to analyse Socrates’ remark as though it was untranslatable, in
the manner we saw before.
A couple of elementary results, for a start, will show how the closely re-
lated approach using propositional referential terms does not have this unfor-
tunate consequence. First it is true that if a sentence x signifies that what
that sentence signifies is false (or not true) then there is not just one thing the
sentence signifies, but one thing that is true and another thing that is false.
This would arise, for example, with ‘What this sentence signifies is not true’,
on a self-referential reading of ‘this sentence’. For if Sxλ(9r)[Sxr & (t)(Sxt ﬀ
t = r) & ¬Tr], then, if (r)(Sxr ﬀ Tr), then, by substitution, Tλ(9r)[Sxr &
(t)(Sxt ﬀ t = r) & ¬Tr], and so in particular (9r)(Sxr & ¬Tr), a contra-
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diction. So ¬(r)(Sxr ﬀ Tr), i.e. (9r)(Sxr & ¬Tr). But the latter, together
with Sxλ(9r)[Sxr & ¬Tr], means that (9r)(Sxr & Tr). But that means that
(9t)(9r)(Sxt & Sxr & ¬Tt & Tr), and so (9t)(9r)(Sxt & Sxr & t 6= r).
Of course, from (9r)(Sxr & ¬Tr) one can derive Sxr(Sxr & ¬Tr) &
¬Tr(Sxr & ¬Tr), while from (9r)(Sxr & Tr) one can get Sxr(Sxr & Tr) &
Tr(Sxr & Tr), so identifying the leading candidates for r(Sxr & ¬Tr) and
r(Sxr & Tr) is quite straightforward since Sxλ(9r)[Sxr & (t)(Sxt ﬀ t =
r)], while ¬Tλ(9r)[Sxr & (t)(Sxt ﬀ t = r)], and Sxλ(9r)[Sxr & ¬Tr], while
Tλ(9r)[Sxr & ¬Tr].
Notice also that parallel things would arise given Syλ(9r)[Sxr & (t)(Sxt ﬀ
t = r) & ¬Tr], i.e. with, for example, ‘What that sentence signifies is not true’
with the previous sentence as the referent of ‘that sentence’. For Syλ(9r)[Sxr &
(t)(Sxt ﬀ t = r)], and Syλ(9r)[Sxr & ¬Tr], and what y says here are, respec-
tively, false and true. So in this case the report given by y carries completely
the same message as the original expression by x, i.e. the content of x is un-
problematically translatable.
A different result is obtainable supposing merely that a sentence signi-
fies that something it signifies is not true, i.e. Sxλ(9r)(Sxr & ¬Tr), which is
the same case as that above without the uniqueness clause. Certainly then,
again, if (r)(Sxr ﬀ Tr), then, by substitution, Tλ(9r)(Sxr & ¬Tr), and so
(9r)(Sxr & ¬Tr), a contradiction. Hence ¬(r)(Sxr ﬀ Tr), i.e. (9r)(Sxr & ¬Tr).
And the latter, together with what was explicitly said in this case, means that
(9r)(Sxr & Tr). So again something x signifies is false, and something x signi-
fies is true. But while, again, one thing that is said that is true is the content of
the sentence, i.e. λ(9r)(Sxr & ¬Tr), whatever is said that is false is not immedi-
ately expressible in a ‘that’-clause, but instead is just referred to by the epsilon
term in ‘Sxr(Sxr & ¬Tr) & ¬Tr(Sxr & ¬Tr)’. And now no entirely compa-
rable result is entailed if Syλ(9r)(Sxr & ¬Tr), since then, while it follows that
(9r)(Syr & Tr), there is no way to obtain that (9r)(Syr & ¬Tr).
Turning now to Read’s case above, we find it is the same as this last one,
since it is about a sentence that says not about what it says, but about itself that
it is false. Writing Vs  (r)(Ssr ﬀ Tr), then given Ssλ¬Vs we immediately get
from the last case that (9r)(Ssr & ¬Tr), and that (9r)(Ssr & Tr). The former
result shows that in fact ¬Vs (Read’s ‘Fa(s)’), and it is from this fact, with
Ssλ¬Vs, that we get that there is something Socrates says that is true, namely
λ(9r)(Ssr & ¬Tr). Given Spλ¬Vs, that means also that (9r)(Spr & Tr), for the
same substitution instance, showing Socrates and Plato do then say one and
the same thing that is true. But what it is that Socrates implies that is false in
uttering what he did is not so easily locatable, and in fact what anyone might
add to get something equivalent to the whole of what Socrates is implying
is not obtainable from the given linguistic context, since it is not expressed
explicitly there.
It is at this point that the present account wins out over Read’s, since there
is still something Plato might add to express an equivalent to what Socrates
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is thinking—if only Socrates would make it explicit in a ‘that’-clause. So what
Socrates is thinking as a whole is not untranslatable; it is merely not wholly
translatable given the limited description of the context presented above. The
central formal difference from Read’s account which allows for this is that the
limited context above, even if it does not give us what proposition is implied
that is false, still does give us a means of referring to that proposition, and also
ensures us that that proposition is a different proposition from the one ex-
plicitly made. For ¬Tr(Ssr & ¬Tr), while Tλ(9r)(Ssr & ¬Tr). But only the
speaker, Socrates, can help us to locate r(Ssr & ¬Tr) explicitly, and so ex-
press it, since by just uttering ‘Socrates utters a falsehood’ he has yet to spell
out which falsehood is on his mind. In this connection it is important to note
that while the remark is ‘self-referential’ in that it refers to the speaker mak-
ing it, and also to the sentence that is used to express it, there is no indica-
tion that what proposition is taken to be false is what is then said, i.e. that
Ssλ(y)(Ssy ﬀ y = λ(9r)(Ssr & ¬Tr)). If that had been added then we would
have a case like the initial one analysed, where there was an explicit mention of
something said that was false. But the case Read has described is strictly with-
out this further form of ‘self-reference’, making what is implied that is false
indeterminate, from what has so far been given.
Quite generally, if a speaker makes an existential remark like ‘(9r)Pr’, then
we can ask ‘Which P is it?’ with the ‘it’ then in question being tracked by the
associated epsilon term ‘rPr’; and if a speaker says ‘¬(r)Pr’ then we can ask
‘Which is it that is not P?’ with the ‘it’ in question being tracked by ‘r¬Pr’.
It is something of the former kind which is a candidate for being the extra,
unexpressed thought Socrates has that is not true when he utters ‘(9r)(Ssr &
¬Tr)’. That Socrates was thinking something that is false is demonstrably true, but
he needs to tell us what he was thinking that he was thinking and was false, before
we have a chance of telling him explicitly what he was thinking that is false.
There are two cases, the first being the case above where uniqueness is a part
of the very thought he is then actually having, and is just what is false. That is
to say we have Ssλ(Sst & ¬Tt) with t = λ(9r)(Ssr & ¬Tr), while Tλ(9r)(Ssr &
¬Tr). But it also may be that he thinks he is implying something else by the
remark we have been considering, and thinks that that proposition is false,
i.e. that Ssλ(Sst & ¬Tt) for a quite separate t 6= λ(9r)(Ssr & ¬Tr). Since,
however, he is not implying anything else, this implication is imaginary and
we have ¬(Sst & ¬Tt), so ‘λ(Sst & ¬Tt)’ provides the needed truth maker for
‘(9t)(Ssr & ¬Tr)’.
One needs to be familiar with the epsilon calculus to realise fully that mak-
ing an existential remark always means referring, or at least alluding to an in-
stance, since the predicate calculus hasn’t got an automatic placeholder for
what individual thing is being spoken about when someone makes such a re-
mark. Intuitionists do not appreciate this point fully, and in particular would
have difficulty with a request for a witness to a negated universal remark in the
manner presented before. The epsilon calculus does not sit easily with Intu-
Hartley Slater, “Translatable Self-Reference”, Australasian Journal of Logic (10) 2011, 45–51
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2011 50
itionistic Logic (see [12, p. 397–402] for a full discussion) and the matter is set-
tled against this logic if it is granted that the previous question ‘Which is it that
is not P?’ can be appropriately asked after a negated universal remark. For even
if the identity of r¬Pr is unknown, at least it is then granted that ¬Pr¬Pr,
and so (9r)¬Pr. But the further problem in Read’s case is that the existential
quantifier is within the scope of an intensional operator, so any instantiation
which the speaker might produce is up to him to say, and remains a feature of
the broader pragmatic context. It may seem that there is nothing similar in
the earlier case without a uniqueness clause, since no speaker was nominated,
and how could a bare sentence provide an explicit answer to what further it
implicitly means in that case? But no sentence on its own is self-referential [9],
since one cannot, for instance, derive by objectival Existential Generalisation
“(9z)(z = ‘(9r)(Szr & ¬Tr)’)” from “x = ‘(9r)(Sxr & ¬Tr)’ ”. The presence of
the quotes prevents this, but also, thereby, the ‘x’ in quotes might refer to a
quite different sentence, as, equally, ‘this sentence’ in ‘what this sentence sig-
nifies is not true’ would do if it were accompanied with a gesture to another
sentence. So to get the supposed referent of ‘x’ and make it the case (in in-
direct speech) that Sxλ(9r)(Sxr & ¬Tr), the sentence ‘(9r)(Sxr & ¬Tr)’ must
be uttered by someone giving it a self-referential interpretation. Therefore to
get an answer to the question about what r(Sxr & ¬Tr) is, one must ask that
speaker.
The need to consider the speaker’s intentions to secure the self-reference
is centrally relevant in connection with other cases, for instance when speaker
M says ‘Everything thought by M is false’. For in order to ensure that the
quoted ‘M’ is used to refer to the speaker in question the speaker must realise
that the universal thought expressed here is one of his or her thoughts. Forget-
ting this we might symbolise the content of the expression by just reporting:
Smλ(r)(Smr ﬀ ¬Tr). The analysis of this proceeds much as before, since if we
suppose that (r)(Smr ﬀ ¬Tr) then, by substitution (9r)(Smr & Tr), a contra-
diction, proving that (9r)(Smr & Tr). But that, together with the initial report
then means that (9r)(Smr & ¬Tr). The instance that verifies the latter exis-
tence claim is thereby assured, but what is the instance that verifies the former
existence claim, i.e. that (9r)(Smr & Tr)? It is not available from the context
as so far formalised, and has to be derived from what the above incomplete
report has missed out: SmλSmλ(r)(Smr ﬀ ¬Tr). For that, with what was pre-
viously reported entails (9r)(Smr & Tr). A similar implication was available
in the other case, namely that SsλSsλ(9r)(Ssr & ¬Tr), although this was not
needed in the analysis above.
To think that some sentences involved in problems to do with self-reference
must have a speaker whose unvoiced thoughts are relevant to the case is not
commonly realised. But I suppose some people might also have to adjust to
the complex, delicate subtlety of the analysis of this sort of situation that is
now clearly available formally. It really is quite remarkable, I agree. But it is
just a symbolisation of natural language, so it is that natural language that such
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people should better respect. For the record, many other paradoxes are dis-
solved this way, such as Curry’s Paradox (which Read deals with elsewhere [7])
and also, for instance, The Knower Paradox, and Gödel’s Paradox [10]. Two
other major problems for Priorian propositional quantification I have shown
to disappear with the more sophisticated, referential version [8, 13]—Read has
yet to address either of these issues. The only relevant paradox I have not pre-
viously discussed is Field’s Paradox, but that is resolved in much the same way
as in [7, 175].
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